Purchase of this book includes free trial access to www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book: I. MEANING FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ACTIVITY In electing as a psychological method the conception of activity, we are bound, as we said, to a certain attitude toward the concept. We must regard it as the final word of explanation, as that from which as concrete and unrationalized we start out, and as that to which we come back in our most generalized statement — the ultimate being. We treat it as that which, if given, we can get the rest out of. All psychic phenomena, then, must find their order and significance within an act — all conscious process being a kind of striving. The category of activity is commonly found discussed under the name of will, desire, attention, and conation or effort; but belief in its applicability to all forms of conscious life is supported by the fact that in these discussions interest seems to focus in the most highly generalized aspects of the mental process, and that the characteristics most dwelt upon under desire, attention, and so on, can with reason be alleged of all conscious experience whatsoever. This is evidenced in the following cases. First let it be said that in the contemporary psychological treatment of activity there appears to be a dawning uniformity in the direction of identifying the problem of will with the problem of attention. Among those who do this are Wundt, James, Dewey, Kiilpe, and Miinsterberg. The two terms, " Will " and " Attention," therefore, will be used interchangeably to the extent that citations concerning each of them will be considered relevant to the other. i. The anticipatory nature of volition, the forward reference of will, is one of the facts which most frequently solicit notice. Thus in effort there is always some object ahead, in desire some image of a coming gratification. Miinsterberg in the Will... --This text refers to an alternate Paperback edition.