The Six-Day War, albeit brief, had lasting effects upon the previous political-military paradigms of the Middle East and upon modern military campaign strategists. The region had been in tumult since World War II and Israel had fought several wars already to win its right to exist. In the weeks preceding June 5, 1967, openly broadcasted their intentions to destroy the nation and “cut the Jew’s throats,” as Arab armies converged and a blockade was established in violation of previous international treaties. But Israel was not unprepared. They had identified critical national objectives, developed a national strategy, and devised a military campaign plan for the times they faced. Crucial to that strategy was the pre-emptive plan resident in Operation MOKED designed to strike and destroy the enemy’s center of gravity (their air forces) and allow Israel to achieve the necessary air superiority to successfully prosecute its ground campaign phases. Before the sun set on June 5th, Israel had utterly crippled the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi air forces ability to strike into Israel and by June 10th Israel stood victorious, meeting all national security objectives of the campaign. This paper will use Crowl’s Questions to analyze Israel air campaign strategy conducted in the Six-Day War and determine why did Israel’s political and military leaders decide to initiate Operation MOKED air campaign plan in support of its national objectives.